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This paper presents the outline for a smart market geared to Quebec’s woodchip industry.  It aims
to explain how such a market operates, and to show how it fits into or modifies the existing trading
system.
The proposed smart market has two main objectives.  The first is to enhance the efficiency of the
woodchip market.  The electronic market is a favoured means of enhancing market flexibility and
thus controlling the accumulation of unsold inventory.  Such a mechanism maximizes the industry’s
overall profits by ensuring that each firm can identify all business opportunities within its reach and
realize the additional profits associated with them.  The second main objective is continuity of trade
practices.  Long-term contracts between sawmills and paper mills are an important market reality,
and they will be an integral part of the smart market.
The keystone of our proposal is the Optimized Periodic Market (OPM).  Somewhat along the lines
of the Encan électronique du porc (EÉP, or electronic pork auction), set up by the Fédération des
producteurs de porcs du Québec (Quebec’s pork producers federation), we are proposing to establish
an electronic woodchip exchange which would open up periodically (monthly, for instance) to
allocate Quebec’s entire woodchip output.  At the close of an electronic market session, exchanges
for the month will be determined, and everyone will know who he is to receive his woodchips from,
or who he is to deliver them to, along with the price of each transaction and the merchandise
shipment schedule.
The OPM fulfils three main functions:  (1) it co-ordinates players’ actions with a view to reducing
inventory surpluses and meeting paper mills’ needs as closely as possible; (2) it keeps transportation
costs down by determining the least costly exchanges between sawmills and paper mills with respect
to supply; and (3) it offers an effective tool for renegotiating long-term contracts.
An OPM session is in three main stages:  pre-sale, sale and after-sale.  At the pre-sale stage, the
system gathers the information it will use to determine optimum exchanges.  This information
concerns two key variables in the woodchip market:  quality requirements, and transportation costs.
 Buyers first express their technical requirements:  on a BBS, they indicate the quality of the
woodchips they wish to purchase and the penalties that will be applied should delivery not be in
compliance with the specified technical requirements.  The sellers are then invited to provide a
production cost indicator for their woodchips that meets each paper mill’s requirements.  Sellers must
also indicate the unit transportation costs (UTC) which they will have to pay if they deliver to each
of the buyers.  An auction mechanism for transportation costs, where buyers and third parties will
be able to try to lower transportation costs, may also be set up.
The sale stage involves an auction which takes place in successive rounds.  Buyers’ bids are demand
schedules, and sellers’ bids are supply schedules.  At the start of the opening round, buyers and
sellers enter their bids through an electronic interface linked to a server.  Sellers must also provide
a list of the types of woodchips they wish to market, and this list will be valid for the duration of the
sale.  Depending on the classification of the woodchips they put up for sale and their ability to sort
species, they will have the choice of offering low density chips, high density chips, and/or jack pine
chips.  Buyers take part in a single market grouping together the three types of woodchips.  At the
start of the opening round, they have to specify the minimum and maximum proportions of each type
of woodchips they wish to acquire.Working Paper 1.0
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When all the bids have been tallied, the system generates the quantities traded and the equilibrium
price paid or received by each participant.  In light of this information, players can raise or lower
their bids in line with their assessment of the market.  Buyers can also revise the proportions of each
type of woodchips they are asking for.  Another round is then initiated, ending with the
re-optimization of the system and disclosure of the new allocations.  If no one wishes to alter his bid
after the prices and quantities are announced at the end of a round, the efficient bilateral exchanges
become official, and the delivery schedule for the period is established.  Bid changes from one round
to the next are governed by an eligibility rule whose function is to give impetus to the market, to
prompt participants to be active in the market, and to reveal their real needs as early as possible.
The OPM is a medium-term market in that it lies between a long-term compensatory market and a
short-term spot market.  Sawmills and paper mills wishing to guarantee their supply by signing
long-term agreements will be able to go the compensatory contract route.  A long-term
compensatory contract between a sawmill and a paper mill specifies a price and quantity of
woodchips for each OPM period (each month).  In this way, the paper mill is guaranteed a certain
quantity of woodchips at a certain price, and the sawmill is guaranteed a price for a given portion
of its output.  Data from these compensatory contracts are then taken into consideration by the OPM.
 Somewhat like term markets, compensatory contracts are agreements on financial flow alone.  It is
the OPM which determines the actual exchanges of woodchips.
The proposed market mechanism is designed to ensure that participation in the OPM is to everyone’s
benefit.  With flexibility, transparency and the implementation of an open competitive mechanism,
beneficial participation for all is one of the guiding principles of the smart market for woodchips.
 A participant bound by a compensatory contract is guaranteed to find himself, after an OPM session,
in a situation at least as beneficial as that provided for in the contract.  The spirit of the compensation
mechanism is that if one of the partners receives an unfavourable price on the OPM, he will be
compensated by his partner.  In this way, the OPM compensation rule and renegotiation mechanism
offer a procedure guaranteeing:  (1) each participant the equivalent of what is negotiated in the
long-term contract; and (2) all participants the possibility of discovering and realizing additional
profits that are accessible but have not yet been realized.
The proposed smart market is rounded out by a very short-term spot market on which sawmills will
be able to liquidate their surpluses and paper mills will be able to procure additional quantities of
woodchips, thus dealing with surpluses and unfilled requirements not anticipated in the OPM
session.  The spot market may be presented in the form of a BBS through which each facility will
be able to initiate an auction.Working Paper 1.0
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Part I:  Introduction
What distinguishes the smart market is that it manages market players’ supply and demand so as to
determine the quantities of commodities traded and the amount of the transactions.  In Quebec, there
is already at least one experience of this type of market:  the Encan électronique du porc (EÉP, or
electronic pork auction).
The architecture of the EÉP does not, however, appear to us to be appropriate for the woodchip
market.  While the EÉP certainly determines bilateral exchanges, it addresses the question of
transportation of the commodity, and then that of buyers' quality requirements, only secondarily.  But
the woodchip market stands out precisely owing to its high transportation costs and the special
requirements expressed by buyers during transactions.  That is why we have placed these two
variables front and centre in the market mechanism we propose in these pages. 
Objectives:  Efficiency and continuity
Our fundamental objective is the enhancement of market efficiency, and that supposes a degree of
change in current trade practices.  We believe, however, that this objective may be attained while
ensuring continuity with traditional procedures.  We have attempted to develop a market mechanism
which will enable the paper companies to pursue their current provisioning strategies while allowing
each player to enhance his market position.  Whether it be a sawmill or a pulp and paper mill, the
facility thus remains free either to maintain past gains or to harness the new tools that will be
available to it. 
Solution:  the Optimized Periodic Market
At present, the woodchip market is governed primarily by long-term contracts between buyers and
sellers.  Underlying these contracts are special, long-established relationships between paper mills
and sawmills.  A particular form of this provisioning strategy is the integration of sawmills with
paper mills.  Approximately 70% of woodchips are produced by integrated sawmills.  The vast
majority of woodchips are sold to a subsidiary or under medium and long-term contracts.  These
special relationships are therefore at the core of business strategy in the industry, aiming to guarantee
and stabilize the provisioning of pulp and paper mills. 
Standing alongside this "long-term market" is an informal spot market.  This market complements
the long-term market by permitting exchanges not anticipated in long-term contracts (excess demand
from paper mills, excess supply from sawmills).  Now we note that, in its present configuration, the
woodchip market is far from being as flexible as it could be and is unable to curb the accumulation
of inventory or to meet firms' needs.  Unsold inventory and inadequate output are symptoms of a
market's inefficiency.
We propose the creation of an Optimized Periodic Market (OPM) in the medium term to
complement the current annual contract/spot market sequence.  This centralized market will
determine optimal exchanges (who sells to whom?  who buys from whom?) for a given period (one
month), on the basis of data from long-term contracts and after having gathered a certain amount ofWorking Paper 1.0
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relevant information.  This information primarily concerns transportation costs between the
producing and client facilities, sawmill supply, and paper mill demand and requirements.
The OPM will seek:
- to coordinate players’ actions with a view to reducing surplus inventory and ensuring that paper
mills’ needs are adequately met;
- to reduce transportation costs by determining the least costly exchanges between sawmills and
paper mills with respect to provisioning;
- to offer an effective tool for renegotiating long-term contracts.
An efficient market...
The OPM will allocate the resource as efficiently as possible, in light of the available information.
 In other words, the OPM is a mechanism aimed at maximizing the profits of the industry as a whole.
 Consider the viewpoint of the manager of the vast enterprise which would result from total
integration of the industry, that is, grouping together all pulp and paper mills and all sawmills into
a single enterprise.  For this manager, it would be important for production to be organized so that
exchanges among the various corporate components generated the lowest possible costs (in particular
transportation costs between facilities) and maximized the profits of each production unit.  Managers
or management systems fulfilling this task would achieve their prime objective:  maximization of
profits.   The more efficient an industry is, the higher its overall profits are.  The OPM must act a
little like the manager of this perfectly integrated enterprise and target maximization of the industry’s
overall profit.
Continuity in trade practices...
Continuity, our second major objective, is inseparable from the issue of paper mills’ steady
provisioning.  For a paper mill, long-term contracts are genuine insurance policies, since they
guarantee it regular provisioning from suppliers with whom it often has special relations.  Through
these contracts, which are important factors in controlling exchanges, the facility contributes to the
stability of the market and the industry.  Far from bringing this type of market into question, we
believe it could benefit from the electronic tools developed for the OPM and that it would have a
good chance of enhancing its flexibility.  Indeed, the same is true for the spot market.
The price of the resource is generally negotiated each year.  Since a fluctuation in this price is
necessarily profitable to only one of the two contracting parties, negotiating long-term agreements
on the basis of the state of the market is most often more than a little arbitrary.  The spectre of
renegotiating these agreements is detrimental to their credibility, and therefore lessens their ability
to stabilize exchanges.
While they exert a stabilizing influence, long-term agreements may sometimes represent an iron
collar.  Their widespread use actually deprives contracting parties and the industry as a whole of
additional profits.  Whence the att6raction of a shorter-term market mechanism emphasising
potential gains and providing the opportunity to realize them while maintaining longer-term
guarantees with respect to supplies.  Provided a paper mill or sawmill can upwardly revise theirWorking Paper 1.0
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needs or output without at the same time being forced to go back on the terms of the contracts
binding them with their partners, the OPM will be able to bring back credibility to long-term
contracts and reduce the arbitrary dimension of the negotiations at their signing.
The OPM will therefore permit the establishment of a rigorous, non-arbitrary framework for
renegotiating long-term contracts, thus conferring the legitimacy essential to the signing of equitable
contracts.  No longer having to negotiate them systematically whenever the market fluctuates,
facilities will be able to measure all the implications, both legal and financial, of their long-term
contracts.  It is important to specify here that to be taken into consideration by the OPM, a long-term
contract will have to specify not only a quantity exchanged, but also a price.  Now, in the industry
there is a trade practice which involves contracting very long-term agreements on quantities, without
considering the price of the commodity or the amount of the transaction.  This type of transaction
will remain possible, but outside the OPM, which will not take it into account in determining
exchanges.
The periodic market will also enable paper mills which do not wish to sign long-term contracts to
guarantee their provisioning through the OPM.  Likewise for the sawmills, which will, if they wish,
be able to sell their output exclusively through the OPM.  It is reasonable to believe that the
possibility of an agreement other than over the long term will have the effect of levelling the playing
field between the parties during negotiations.  In this way, the transparent, equitable character of the
market will be enhanced.
Guiding principles
In formal terms, attaining efficiency and continuity objectives by setting up an Optimized Periodic
Market for woodchips will have to follow the four guiding principles set out below.
1- Participation beneficial for all parties
Our proposal for a smart market for woodchips would not be timely if it did not guarantee that
participation will be beneficial for all parties.  To state that participation in the OPM is beneficial
for all market players is to say that the OPM is a system within which no facility or group will be
able to enhance its position in isolation.
Furthermore, the OPM incorporates current trade practices instead of substituting new ones for them.
 There is nothing to prevent a sawmill and a paper mill from taking part in the OPM, while
continuing to sign long-term agreements between themselves.  The market mechanism we propose
is designed so that each facility (sawmill and paper mill) receives at least the equivalent of what it
has negotiated under long-term contracts.  In other words, a facility which has signed a long-term
agreement will never find itself, at the end of an OPM session, in a situation less enviable than that
described in the terms of the contract.  None the less, since negotiated agreements do not necessarily
correspond to the optimum allocation, the OPM will be able to find more efficient allocations.  If
the bilateral exchange negotiated by contract proves to be optimal, the OPM will recommend it, but
if it is beneficial to only one of the contracting parties, a compensation system will offset the losses
sustained by the other party and thus enable the parties to complete the transaction.  Through itsWorking Paper 1.0
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operation, the OPM guarantees each party a share of the benefits associated with the profits of the
exchange.
2- Flexibility
It is essential that the market mechanism attribute to paper mills woodchips which meet their
requirements.  That is why the OPM authorizes them to set the quality requirements which suit them.
 The flexibility of the OPM makes it possible, in particular, to intervene in the market to request a
single type of woodchips (low density, high density or jack pine) or more than one in variable
proportions.  The market must also be in a position to provide the paper mills with the quantity of
woodchips they want.
We feel it is important that the market mechanism allow buyers to pursue provisioning strategies that
are appropriate to them.  The OPM offers all the latitude desired for market players to be able to
conclude beneficial bilateral agreements in the relatively long term, while remaining fully involved
in the market mechanism.  For instance, a paper mill wishing to buy on a priority basis from its own
sawmills will be in a position to do so.  In fact, paper mills will be able to favour a sawmill, on the
grounds, for instance, that the transportation cost between them is zero.  They will not, however, be
able to give unfavourable treatment to a specific sawmill.
3- Transparency
An efficient market is a market where all parties are treated equitably.  Thus, the OPM is based on
clear, non-arbitrary rules.  As far as possible, these rules must limit the opportunities for collusion.
 Seeking transparency in this way involves respecting the anonymity of participants, although certain
phases of the OPM may not be anonymous.
4- A competitive, open mechanism
The OPM is intended to be a flexible mechanism which enables buyers to revise their demand and
sellers to revise their supply according to the state of the market.  That is why no one is limited to
his first assessment of his needs or his desire to produce.  The possibility of benefiting from a
belatedly noticed business opportunity remains open throughout the process, in line with objective
rules that are known to everyone.  Thus, the OPM at all times permits the paper mills and sawmills
to buy or sell the quantities they wish, provided they are prepared to accept a fair price for the
merchandise.
Brief description of the smart market for woodchips
The Optimized Periodic Market (OPM) described in this paper is a market for woodchips which
opens up at set intervals.  Hypothetically, we have set this interval at one month, but it will be up to
the industry to define the frequency which best meets its needs.  At the end of each session, the
computer system generates the bilateral exchanges (which sawmill sells which quantity of which
type of woodchips to which paper mill) and sets the purchase and selling prices.  The prices and
quantities exchanged are deemed to be only those which maximize the industry’s efficiency.Working Paper 1.0
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Throughout the process, the quantities and prices generated by the system depend on two critical
variables in the woodchip market.
1.  Buyers’ technical requirements:  their public announcement is the first event in this session, so
that they act as the backdrop to the entire process.
2. Transportation costs:  the sawmills are first invited to announce the cost of forwarding their
merchandise to the different pulp and paper mills in the market.  This public announcement is
used as the basis for an auction on transportation costs where sawmills, carriers and paper mills
compete openly so that transportation of the merchandise is paid for by those in a position to do
so at the lowest cost.
These announcements form the core of the activity of a market session before the sale proper of
woodchips begins.  Allocation of output (who will sell or buy how much) takes place according to
an auction process where buyers’ bids are their demand schedule (which quantity of woodchips am
I prepared to buy and at which prices) and sellers’ bids are their supply schedule (which quantity of
woodchips am I prepared to sell and at which prices).  Buyers and sellers are invited to bid, to
disclose their supply and demand, through a computer interface linked to a server.
The auction takes place in successive rounds.  At the start of each round, buyers and sellers key in
their bids on their microcomputers.  Once the bids have been tallied, the system generates the
quantities exchanged, purchase prices and selling prices.  In light of this information, the players
alter their bids on the basis of their appreciation of the state of the market, and a new round is
initiated, ending in its turn with re-optimization of the system and disclosure of the new allocations.
 If no one wishes to change his bid after the prices and quantities are announced, efficient bilateral
exchanges are deemed to have been determined.
An OPM session ends with the officialization of the bilateral exchanges that will take place during
the period leading up to the next market session.  The delivery and transportation schedules are then
established.
The long-term contracts negotiated prior to the OPM sessions are inserted in the form of
compensatory contracts.  These contracts specify cash transfers that will be paid by the various
parties.  The structure of the financial compensation is such that a buyer is compensated if the price
obtained on the OPM exceeds that negotiated in the contract, and vice versa for the seller.  It is
therefore necessary for these long-term contracts to specify a quantity and a price.  So long as no
price has been negotiated under a long-term agreement, this will not be considered by the OPM in
the exchange optimization process.
Finally, the spot market enables sellers and buyers to clear stock quickly or to procure surplus
woodchips.  In this way, it helps paper mills and sawmills deal with unexpected contingencies.Working Paper 1.0
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Part II:  Operation of the smart market
This section presents a detailed description of the smart market.  First, in Section 1, we describe the
operation of the Optimized Periodic Market (OPM).  This market will be open at set intervals.  The
frequency remains to be determined:  in this paper, we postulate one-month intervals.  The OPM is
distinguished by the complexity of its operation, over which, it should be noted, long-term contracts
have no direct effect.
In Section 2, we describe how long-term contracts are negotiated and how they fit into the context
of the OPM.  Long-term contracts are interpreted by the OPM as compensatory contracts; if a seller
obtains a price on the OPM lower than that negotiated in his long-term contracts, he will be
compensated by the buyers with whom he negotiated those contracts.  The converse applies when
the buyer has to pay more than the negotiated price.
In Section 3, we present the operation of the spot market with regard to additional quantities to be
exchanged during the period covered by the OPM.
Where necessary, the reader may refer to the two appendices following this paper.  Appendix I
presents a glossary of the different terms used in the paper.  The more technical Appendix 2 explains
the operation of the OPM optimization module.
1- Operation of the Optimized Periodic Market
The market opens up once a month.  The woodchips available are classified by type:  low density,
high density and jack pine.  Sellers may offer several types of woodchips separately if they grade
their trees, otherwise they may offer only a single woodchip type corresponding to their main
output.
1  Buyers take part in a single market bringing together the three types of woodchips.  They
must, however, specify the types of woodchips they wish to procure, and the quantities they wish to
buy.  Each OPM session takes place in three main stages:  pre-sale, sale and after-sale.
First stage:  Pre-sale
The pre-sale stage is divided into three distinct, sequential phases:  announcement of technical
requirements and UTC, announcement of QAF, and adjustment of UTC and QAF.  A public
announcement enables each party, in a first phase, to know the technical requirements of the buyers
(paper mills) and the unit transportation costs (UTC) of the sellers (sawmills).  In the second phase
of the pre-sale, the sellers disclose their quality adjustment factors (QAF), calculated on the basis
of the buyers’ technical requirements as disclosed in the previous phase.
                                                
     
1 Clearly, the industry will have to handle the task of establishing the different criteria defining woodchip types
(high density, low density, jack pine or other).  For instance, the following standard could be established.  For a
seller’s woodchips to be classified in the "high density" category, they should not contain more than 5% jack pine. 
Beyond this threshold, a seller who is not in a position to grade his trees will have to identify his output as "jack
pine" type woodchips.Working Paper 1.0
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These first two phases are followed by a final UTC and QAF adjustment phase.  This phase permits
negotiation between buyers and sellers.  It is essentially a competitive phase, where buyers, sellers
and carriers vie with each other to offer the best transportation costs between sawmills and paper
mills. 
Phase 1:    Announcement of technical requirements and UTC
1. Announcement of technical requirements
Buyers express their own technical requirements.  They do so by disclosing at the sale a table
describing the quality of the woodchips they are asking for (excluding woodchip types - high density,
low density, jack pine - which will be specified at the sale stage) and the penalties which will be
applied in the event the delivery does not meet the specified technical requirements.  All the
technical requirements the buyers deem necessary may be announced.
2.   Announcement of UTC
The sellers announce their unit transportation costs (UTC), that is, the costs they will have to sustain
if they themselves have to handle the transportation of the woodchips sold to the paper mills,
regardless of the transportation mode used.  In Phase 1, it is the sellers (sawmills) which announce
the UTC, but we shall see below (cf. Phase 3) that, at the end of the session, they are not necessarily
the ones handling transportation of the merchandise and paying for it.
Once each UTC is announced, a transportation matrix may be generated.  One could imagine such
a transportation matrix for n vendors (V1, V2, …, Vi, …, Vn) and m buyers (A1, A2, …, Aj, …, Am):
Table 1:  Transportation matrix
A1 A2 …A j …A m






Each tij indicates the UTC between seller i (source) and buyer j (destination).  Thus, if t11 = $50, it
is estimated that it would cost $50 to transport one unit of woodchips from seller V1 to buyer A1.
Since it represents costs, a UTC is by definition positive or zero.  If a sawmill considers that it cannot
afford to deliver the merchandise to a given paper mill, it will then set for that paper mill a UTC
substantially higher than for its other potential clients.
Phase 1 ends when all the tables of technical requirements have been received, along with every
UTC.  A deadline is then set.Working Paper 1.0
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Phase 2:  Announcement of QAF
Phase 2 is initiated by the disclosure of the technical requirements defined during the previous phase.
This information must be known by all market players so the sellers can provide their QAF, which
depends directly on the buyers’ technical requirements.  This second phase must therefore necessarily
include a set period of observation of buyers’ technical requirements by the sellers.
1. Announcement of QAF
Once they have perused each buyer’s technical requirements, the sellers determine and announce
their QAF for each potential buyer.  Once each QAF has been announced, a first technical matrix
may be generated.  Such a technical matrix could be imagined for the same n sellers (V1, V2, …, Vi,
…, Vn) and m buyers (A1, A2, …, Aj, …, Am):
Table 2:  Technical matrix
A1 A2 …A j …A m
V 1 s 11 S12 0
V2 s21 S22 0
…0
V is ij 0
…0
V n 0
Each sij indicates the QAF established by sawmill Vi to produce woodchips meeting the technical
requirements of buyer Aj.  Each sij indicates the additional premium which sawmill Vi requires to
produce woodchips whose quality differs from the industry standard.  In the table above, we have
supposed that buyer Am is asking for woodchips of the "industry reference" type.  We thus obtain sim
= 0 for any i, that is, for all sawmills; sij is therefore positive, negative or zero depending on whether
the quality of the woodchips requested is higher than, lower than or equal to the industry standard.
We could also find rij in the technical matrix.  Rather than being an additive factor, that is, instead
of corresponding to the additional premium demanded by sawmill Vi to produce woodchips whose
quality differs from the industry standard, rij would instead be a multiplicative factor.  In that case,
when buyer j asks for the reference quality, then rij = 1 for any i.   An rij = 1.1 indicates, for instance,
that it costs sawmill i the equivalent of 1.1 tonnes of reference woodchips to produce one tonne of
woodchips of the quality demanded by buyer j.  Similarly, rij = 0.9 indicates that it costs sawmill i
the equivalent of 0.9 tonnes of standard woodchips to produce one tonne of woodchips of the quality
demanded by buyer j.
It is possible to use either parameter, sij or rij.  It is also possible to use both together.  The choice will
have to be made so as to reflect the actual situation as closely as possible.
Phase 2 ends when each QAF has been received.Working Paper 1.0
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Phase 3:  Adjustment of UTC and QAF
Once Phase 2 has been completed, the transportation matrix generated in Phase 1 is disclosed.
Phase 3 must necessarily begin with a period for observation of this matrix by all market players. As
these potentially include third parties (carriers), the transportation matrix must therefore be known
to everyone.
Phase 3 is first of all a phase of UTC adjustment.  Each UTC potentially becomes the subject of a
small auction among buyers, sellers and potential carriers.  A paper mill may, during this phase,
announce a UTC lower than that initially announced by a sawmill.  When a paper mill announces
such a UTC, it automatically commits itself to meeting the transportation costs on this segment.
Similarly, a third party ("carrier") so inclined could undertake to pay for transportation at a UTC
below the buyer’s or seller’s. 
Furthermore, during this phase, the sawmills are also authorized to re-evaluate their QAFs.  These
re-evaluations may stem from direct negotiations between buyers and sellers, since the flexibility of
the system in fact allows buyers to intervene with their potential suppliers to lower their costs, in
particular their QAF.  That is why each buyer will receive at the start of Phase 3 only the information
that concerns him in this regard.  The technical matrix is not to be made public.  On the other hand,
buyer Aj will have to receive the information in column j of this matrix.  Column j lists the QAF of
each sawmill corresponding to the technical requirements disclosed by buyer Aj in Phase 1.  Armed
with the information thus conveyed to them, the buyers will be able to intervene on an ad-hoc basis
with the sawmills and force them to re-evaluate the QAF set by them to meet their customers’
technical requirements.
The closure of Phase 3 also marks the end of the pre-sale stage.  This first stage may end at a pre-set
moment (for instance, 12 hours prior to the start of the sale proper), or if no change has been
recorded in the UTC or QAF within the prescribed time (for example, five minutes).
Second stage:  Sale
The sale essentially involves successive rounds during which the buyers indicate the quantities of
woodchips they wish to buy during the following month (period between each market session), the
different prices they are prepared to pay, and the proportions of the woodchip types they are
interested in.  While the sellers do the same for the quantity of each type of woodchips they are
prepared to sell at different prices.
2  It is from this information that the system will calculate and
determine the optimal allocation, that is, the best allocation of woodchips from the standpoint of
efficiency.  Bilateral exchanges (which sawmill will sell to which paper mill, which quantities will
be exchanged on each market, and at which prices) will be determined at the end of the sale.
Each round includes two distinct, successive phases:  a first phase of submission of bids, and a
second phase of optimization.  The submission of bids phase determines the input of the optimization
                                                
     
2 From a seller’s viewpoint, each woodchip type (high density, low density and jack pine) may be exchanged on a
separate market.  In practical terms, the offers of a seller whose batch includes three types of woodchips will be
made on three "markets".Working Paper 1.0
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problem whose output will determine the bilateral exchanges on each market.  In light of the results
of this optimization process, another round is triggered in order to enable the players, in line with
the eligibility rule, to re-evaluate their supply or their demand.  The system is optimized, and a
matrix of bilateral exchanges is calculated in each round.
Progress of first round
To start with, the sellers must provide a list - valid for the duration of the sale - of the types of
woodchips they wish to sell.  Depending on the classification of their woodchips and their ability to
grade the species, they will have the choice of offering woodchips of high density, low density and
jack pine.  A sawmill may offer more than one woodchip type only if it is able to grade its trees and
woodchips.  A seller who does not grade his woodchips will be able to offer only one of the three
types of woodchips corresponding to his "average" woodchip type.
The buyers take part in a single market bringing together the three types of woodchips.  They must,
however, specify the minimum and maximum proportions of each type of woodchips they wish to
obtain.  For instance, a buyer whose recipes require no more than 30% high density woodchips, a
minimum of 70% low density woodchips and no jack pine chips will specify accordingly the
proportions he is seeking in the recipe table:
Recipe table
Woodchip type Minimum percentage Maximum percentage
Low density 70 100
High density 0 30
Jack pine 0 0
Total: 70 130
Since the value of each woodchip type is not necessarily the same, a seller may offer, for a given
price, different quantities of each type of woodchips, provided he apportions his offer to the three
different markets.
For the buyers, the situation is different.  What matters to them is the total quantity, average price
and composition (proportion of each woodchip type in the total quantity purchased) of the
woodchips.  So the demand is grouped together within a single market, and buyers are permitted to
specify the proportions they want.  The average price, but also the price of each woodchip type
purchased as well as the quantity obtained will be disclosed in each round.  The buyers will then be
able to reduce or increase the quantities requested and the proportions announced in light of this
information.
1. Submission of buyers’ bids
Each buyer must provide a demand schedule, that is, a series of pairs (price, quantity) each indicating
the number of woodchip units desired and the corresponding price.  These are the prices that haveWorking Paper 1.0
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been defined as paper mill acquisition prices:  what a buyer is prepared to pay to procure a given
quantity of woodchips corresponding to his technical requirements.  Paper mill acquisition prices
therefore include transportation costs, regardless of who actually pays for them.
To complete his demand schedule, a buyer must first ask himself the following question:  how many
woodchip units would I be prepared to buy if the price were set at x, y, and so on?  Normally, the
lower the price is, the larger are the quantities requested.  In answering this question, the buyer
establishes a relationship between the price and the quantity requested, and it is this relationship
which enables him to draw his private demand curve.  The demand schedule must be designed from
this private demand curve.  In fact, the buyer must disclose a number of points, (price, quantity)
pairs, that will form his demand schedule and from which his disclosed demand curve will be
constructed.
A buyer’s demand schedule consists of a list of prices arranged in descending order, with which
requested quantities are associated, necessarily in ascending order.
A demand schedule will always be accompanied by a recipe table enabling buyers to specify the
desired proportions of each woodchip type.  Each buyer must therefore complete his recipe table,
respecting the following constraints:
(1) Minimum £ Maximum for each woodchip type
(2) Sum of minimums £ 100%
(3) Sum of maximums ³ 100%.
The demand schedule and recipe table represent buyers’ first-round «bid».  In fact, each buyer
discloses a certain number of points which will form his disclosed demand curve and his
requirements as to woodchip types.  The series formed by the demand schedule and the recipe table
accompanying it will typically take the following form:
Table 4:  Demand schedule and recipe table








107 48Working Paper 1.0
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Woodchip type Minimum percentage Maximum percentage
Low density 50 70
High density 20 50
Jack pine 0 20
Total: 70 140
The demand schedule is interpreted as follows:
• at a price above $130, the buyer asks for quantity nil; by convention, and without the buyer
having to specify it, the system will create the (price, quantity) pair (131, 0) to incorporate the
information disclosed by the buyer whereby $130 is the maximum price at which he is prepared
to purchase;
• at a price of $130, the buyer asks for 10,000 units;
• at a price between $125 and $130, the buyer asks for a quantity between 10,000 and 20,000 units;
• at a price of $125, the buyer asks for 20,000 units;
• at a price between $120 and $125, the buyer asks for a quantity between 20,000 and 30,000 units;
and so on for the subsequent prices;
• at a price below $107, the buyer always asks for 48,000 units -- this represents as it were his
maximum demand.  By convention, and without the buyer having to specify it, the system will
create the (price, quantity) pair (0, 48,001) to incorporate the information disclosed by the buyer
whereby a price below $107 will have no significant impact on the quantity he asks for.
To fill in the spaces in the demand schedule established by the buyer, the system draw straight lines.
The recipe table is interpreted as follows:
• the total quantity of woodchips desired must contain no less than 50% low density woodchips;
• the total quantity of woodchips desired must contain no more than 70% low density woodchips;
• the total quantity of woodchips desired must contain no less than 20% high density woodchips;
• the total quantity of woodchips desired must contain no more than 50% high density woodchips;
• the total quantity of woodchips desired must contain no more than 20% jack pine woodchips.
2. Submission of sellers' bids
At the same time, the sellers provide their supply schedules, or bids.  A seller offering more than one
woodchip type must submit an equivalent number of supply schedules.  Like the buyers, a seller, to
complete his supply schedule, must first ask himself the following question:  how many woodchip
units would I be prepared to sell if the price was set at x, y, and so on?  Normally, the lower the price
is, the smaller the quantities offered will be.  In answering this question, the seller establishes a
relationship between the price and the quantity offered, and it is this relationship which enables him
to draw his private supply curve.  The supply schedule must be designed from this private supply
curve.  In fact, the seller must disclose a certain number of points, (price, quantity) pairs, which will
form his supply schedule and from which his disclosed supply curve will be constructed.Working Paper 1.0
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A seller’s supply schedule consists of a list of prices in ascending order with which quantities
offered are associated, necessarily in ascending order.
The sellers provide their supply schedules for reference woodchips.  The sellers therefore disclose
a certain number of points which will form their disclosed supply curves.  A supply schedule
provided by a seller will take the following form:
Table 5:  Supply schedule







This supply schedule is interpreted as follows: 
• at a price below $80, the seller offers nothing; by convention, and without the seller having to
specify it, the system will create the (price, quantity) pair (79, 0) to incorporate the information
disclosed by the seller whereby $80 is the minimum price at which he is prepared to sell;
• at a price of $80, the seller offers 5,000 units;
• at a price between $80 and $85, the seller offers between 5,000 and 7,000 units;
• at a price of $85, the seller offers 7,000 units;
• at a price between $85 and $90, the seller offers between 7,000 and 8,000 units; and so on for
the subsequent prices;
• at a price above $100, the seller always offers 10,000 units -- this is as it were his production
capacity.  By convention, and without the seller having to specify it, the system will create the
(price, quantity) pair (a,  10,001), where a is an arbitrarily high price, to incorporate the
information disclosed by the seller whereby raising the price above $100 will have no significant
impact on the quantity he offers.
To fill in the spaces between the points on the seller's supply schedule, the system draws straight
lines.
The first-round bid submission phase can end when all bids (demand and supply schedules) have
been received, or at a pre-determined time.
3. Optimization
The system calculates optimal allocations (prices and quantities) -- those which maximize the
efficiency of the market
3 -- from all the demand and supply schedules provided by the players,
                                                
     
3 For a more comprehensive discussion of the characteristics of the allocations calculated by the system, see
Appendix 2:  Optimization module.Working Paper 1.0
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including the buyers’ recipe tables.  This information is placed against the transportation matrix and
the technical matrix.  Once the optimization process is completed, the system generates the bilateral
exchange matrix (matrix of optimal quantities) stemming from the bids.  For  a given market, the
matrix will typically have the following shape:
Table 6:  Bilateral exchange matrix
A1 A2 …A j …A m






Each qij indicates the total quantity of woodchips that will be exchanged between buyer Aj and seller
Vi if no one expresses a desire to modify his bid.  At the end of the optimization process, each player
receives only the information concerning him.  The seller receives separate quantity and equilibrium
prices for each woodchip type offered.  The buyer also receives a price and equilibrium quantity for
each woodchip type, in addition to the weighted average of prices and the sum of the quantities he
has obtained.  It is from the latter information that he will be able to alter his bid.
In view of transportation costs, the selling price and purchase price for a particular type of woodchips
are not equal, and are generally different for all market players.  Readers interested in the
mathematics of this problem are referred to Appendix 2 of this paper.
For instance, for buyers whose preferences we established in Table 4, the unit equilibrium price
could be $115 for a given market.  At a price of $115, our buyer obtains the 35,000 woodchip units
requested.  Of course, for the equilibrium price set by the optimization process to be exactly the same
as the price for which the buyer has defined a requested quantity is a matter of chance.  Let us take
a more realistic example, namely an equilibrium price set at $112.50.  The quantity asked for and
obtained is then determined according to the straight line automatically drawn by the system between
the (price, quantity) pairs (110, 40) and (115, 35).  As the equilibrium price exactly divides the price
interval in two (for simplicity of explanation), the quantity that will be attributed to the buyer will
correspond to 37,500 woodchip units.  Table 7 gives an idea of what the information provided to the
buyer by the system could be.  A new (price, quantity) pair has been added to it to indicate the price
and the equilibrium quantity in this particular case.Working Paper 1.0
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Tableau 7:  Information received by the buyer after the first round











Low density 18.75 114.50
High density 11.25 110.83
Jack pine 7.5 110
Total 37.5 112.5
Supposing that for the supplier the equilibrium price is $92.50, then the quantity offered and
potentially sold by this supplier will be 8,500 woodchip units.  Table 8 illustrates the information
obtained by this supplier, including the new pair added to the new equilibrium price.
Table 8:  Information received by the seller after the first round








Note that the price announced to the buyer will not be the same as the one announced to the sellers.
For instance, if two sawmills supply the same paper mill with woodchips, the offers it will make to
each of them will be different.  In fact, the sawmill farther away will receive a lower offer, since
transportation costs are higher in its case.  Conversely, if a sawmill sells woodchips to two paper
mills, the paper mill farther away will have to pay more.Working Paper 1.0
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Progress of subsequent rounds
Once the first-round allocations are known, buyers and sellers may be interested in altering their
bids.  Upon the announcement of the start of the second round, the players are authorized to alter
their demand or supply schedules.  The buyers may also alter their recipe tables.  A round may end
at a pre-set time or when all bids have been received.  It could also end if no change in bids has been
recorded within a pre-set period.
Following the bidding period for each round, the system calculates a new matrix for prices and
optimal quantities.  Each player receives the new information concerning him and then decides
whether to alter his bid in the following round.  The process continues, with one round following
another so long as any players wish to alter their bids.  It ends when there is no more activity on the
market when the allocations (prices, quantities) are announced.  Such an adjustment process allows
each participant to obtain the quantities desired even if initially the participant does not know how
much he must bid to obtain those quantities.
1. Changes to buyers’ bids according to the eligibility rule
In an auction process involving successive rounds such as this one, it may be beneficial to establish
eligibility rules whose function is to give impetus to the market.   These are, in fact, rules which
prompt participants to bid in line with their true preferences as early as possible and to be active in
the market.
Let us take a moment to look at the eligibility rule for buyers.  It would be reasonable to envisage
a rule where a buyer wishing to raise his bid (to ask for more at certain prices) would have to do so
in the next round, subject to not being able to do so in subsequent rounds.  Such a rule would avoid
having players merely watch the market for too long before intervening, thus unduly dragging out
the sale phase.
Let us first establish two general restrictions on changes in bids from one round to the next:
1- A player may only raise his bid.
2- Nevertheless, his bid is limited by a «maximum eligibility quantity».
The first restriction implies that a player may only increase the quantities bid upon initially.  He may
in fact raise them, but the new quantities may not exceed the maximum eligibility quantity.  This
quantity is initially set on the basis of the maximum quantity bid upon in the first round. 
For a buyer for whom Table 7 represents the first (first-round) bid, the maximum eligibility quantity
is set at 48, for all prices.  In subsequent rounds, the maximum eligibility quantity at the equilibrium
price will be modified, and will correspond to the new quantity bid upon at this price.  In addition,
the maximum eligibility quantities for prices above the equilibrium price will correspond to the
lesser of the quantity bid upon at the equilibrium price (after the change) and the current maximum
eligibility quantity.Working Paper 1.0
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A buyer may also modify his recipe table.  Two restrictions also apply to these changes:
1- The new minimum must be smaller than or equal to the former minimum corresponding to the
same woodchip type.
2- The new maximum must be greater than or equal to the corresponding former maximum.
Thus, the previous allocations can always be realized, that is, they still comply with the new
minimum and maximum proportions requested.
Thus, let us suppose that our representative buyer wishes to alter his bid in light of the allocation he
receives after the first round.  He may do so by raising the quantity he asks for at the equilibrium
price ($112.50), by lowering the minimum proportions and/or by raising the maximum proportions
in the recipe table.  He could decide to alter his bid in this way for the following round (which we
shall call Round 2):
Table 9:  Demand schedule bid in Round 2 and recipe table












Woodchip type Minimum percentage Maximum percentage
Low density 40 70
High density 20 50
Jack pine 0 20
Total: 60 140
Our buyer has therefore decided to raise his bid at the equilibrium price ($112.50) by 5,500 units,
bringing his total quantity asked for to 43,000, and to lower the minimum proportion of low density
woodchips to 40%.  It is important to note that he could have bid up to a total quantity of 48,000 - his
larger quantity initially requested.
The maximum eligibility quantity is then 43 for all prices above than or equal to $112.50.  By
choosing to bid a quantity of 43 at $112.50, the buyer will lose the chance to purchase more than 43
units unless the price falls again.  At prices below $112.50, the maximum eligibility quantity remains
unchanged.Working Paper 1.0
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The demand curve therefore now includes the (price, quantity) pair (112.50, 43).  The buyer could
also have raised his quantity bid upon to any price whatsoever, provided he complied with the
maximum eligibility quantity for each price.  In order to comply with the restriction stated above,
whereby demand curves necessarily have a negative slope, the system automatically eliminates pairs
which are out of sequence, such as the (110, 40) pair.
Let us suppose that instead of changing the quantities at the equilibrium price, the participant
changes his quantity bid upon at $115 to 44.  Now the demand curve will no longer have a negative
slope, but the system will accept the bid anyway and will adjust the quantity requested at the
equilibrium price.  We will then obtain, by construction, a total quantity requested and a maximum
eligibility quantity at $112.50 (and at the price above $112.50) of 46.
Let us return to the case where the buyer revises his quantity at the equilibrium price and sets it at
43, and let us suppose that after Round 2 the price rises to $117.  The new information received by
the buyer is as follows:
Table 10:  Information received after Round 2













Low density 13.2 120.50
High density 13.2 116
Jack pine 6.6 112
Total 33 117
Our buyer now obtains 33,000 units (rather than 37,500 after Round 1).  If he then considers that the
quantity he is obtaining on the market is insufficient, he may raise his bid at the new equilibrium
price or at any other price up to his maximum eligibility quantity.  Let us suppose that he decides to
take advantage of this opportunity and raise his bid at the equilibrium price by 2,000 units, bringing
his bid up to 35,000 units, and that he decides not to change his recipe table at all.  Table 10 shows
this buyer’s bid in Round 3:Working Paper 1.0
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Table 11:  Demand schedule bid in Round 3 and recipe table












Woodchip type Minimum percentage Maximum percentage
Low density 40 70
High density 20 50
Jack pine 0 20
Total: 60 140
The $115 line is automatically eliminated by the system so that the demand curve remains
downward.  Note that the system favours the higher of the two prices corresponding to a total
quantity of 35.
Let us now look finally at the last figure possible.  Let us suppose that after Round 3 the equilibrium
price has fallen back down to $108, because supply, for instance, has risen more than demand.  The
maximum eligibility quantity corresponding to this price is 48,000 units.  Owing to this price drop,
the buyer could decide to raise his quantities bid at the new equilibrium price ($108) with a view to
Round 4.  He will then define a new (price, quantity) pair, for instance (108, 46).  Table 11 shows
our buyer’s bid in Round 4:Working Paper 1.0
23
Table 12:  Demand schedule bid in Round 4











Note that the new maximum eligibility quantity associated with the equilibrium price (46,000) has
no effect upon maximum eligibility quantities at higher prices.  This is so because the buyer, when
the price was $117, did not feel it necessary to bid more than 35,000 units.  There is no valid reason
for this to have changed.  If the equilibrium price were to climb back over $117, the maximum
quantity the buyer could bid would still be 35,000 units.  Thus, the maximum eligibility quantity for
a given equilibrium price is always lower than or equal to the maximum eligibility quantities of
prices below it.  This latter example illustrates precisely the function of an eligibility rule:  to prompt
the fastest possible convergence of bids toward players’ true preferences.
2. Changes to sellers’ bids in accordance with the eligibility rule
The eligibility rule applies to buyers in the same way that it does to sellers, but in reverse.  It applies
separately to each woodchip type offered.
Let us look again at the example of the allocation received by the seller after the first round, and let
us suppose that he wishes to alter his bid by raising the quantity offered to 9.5:
Table 13:  Supply schedule bid in Round 2










The maximum eligibility quantity therefore becomes 9.5 for all prices below or equal to $92.50. 
Note that the maximum eligibility quantity for a given equilibrium price is always less than or equal
to the maximum eligibility quantities of prices above it.Working Paper 1.0
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Also, to comply with the restriction whereby supply curves necessarily have a positive slope, the
system automatically eliminates the (95, 9) pair, which is now out of sequence.Working Paper 1.0
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2- Operation of the long-term compensatory market
Current practices in the present woodchip market are primarily based upon long-term agreements,
that is, agreements whose application extends for one year or more.   Long-term contracts between
sawmills and paper mills primarily cater to paper mills’ need for steady provisioning.  Any market
mechanism for woodchips will have to take this fact into account.
A long-term contract is a promise made by a sawmill to a paper mill to deliver a certain quantity of
woodchips at a certain price, according to a given schedule.  As we mentioned earlier, it is essential
for the prices negotiated to appear in long-term contracts so they can be incorporated into the OPM’s
exchange optimization process.
To ensure consistency between the long-term market and the medium-term market (OPM), some
adjustments to current trade practices will be necessary.  These adjustments stem from the pursuit
of two sometimes competing objectives, namely, efficiency and continuity.  While continuity and
market stability require the maintenance of long-term agreements, market efficiency calls for them
to be somewhat relaxed.
We propose that the long-term market be governed by compensatory contracts.  Under a
compensatory contract system, long-term agreements concern financial flows alone, as opposed to
actual flows (actual physical exchanges of woodchips).  A long-term compensatory contract between
a sawmill and a paper mill will typically take the form of a guaranteed price for a given quantity of
woodchips and will therefore have to specify a guaranteed price and quantity for periods
corresponding to the intervals between OPM sessions.  For instance, if the OPM opens up every
month, a quantity and a price will have to be negotiated for each month.
This long-term market is similar to existing futures markets.  On a futures market, such as Chicago
for instance, futures contracts are negotiated for a given quantity of a commodity.  Players who
exchange a commodity on the futures market generally have no intention of going ahead with the
"physical" transaction stipulated in their contract.  Their only interest is in the financial flows.  On
the long-term compensatory contract market for woodchips involved here, as on any other futures
market, the paper mills and sawmills will be able to protect themselves against any unfavourable
movement in the price of woodchips, while the actual exchanges are nevertheless still determined
by the OPM.
Compensatory contracts will be negotiable according to customary trade practices or, again, it will
be possible to enhance the flexibility of the long-term market by setting up negotiations assisted by
electronic tools similar to those developed for the OPM.  A long-term compensatory contract will
not be able to deal with more than one type of woodchips (high density, low density or jack pine).
 It may be worded in terms of sawmill selling price, paper mill acquisition price, or both together.
Real flows, that is, exchanges of woodchips, are determined for each month (hypothetically) upon
the closure of the OPM.  Let us consider, for instance, the case of sawmill i and paper mill j, bound
by an annual compensatory contract, and let us suppose that for a UTC of 10 and a QAF of 0, they
negotiated during the first month of the year 100 amt of woodchips at a sawmill selling price (Pv)
of $100/amt equivalent to a paper mill acquisition price (Pa) of $110/amt.  Both facilities participateWorking Paper 1.0
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in the OPM, which then determines actual flows.  At an OPM session, supply and demand for all
facilities in the industry are compiled, and the market is optimized so as to determine the bilateral
exchanges which will take place during the month.  At the end of the session, the paper mill obtains
a certain quantity of woodchips for which it will have to pay a price determined by the optimization
module, and the sawmill receives the mandate to deliver a certain quantity of woodchips for which
it will be paid a given amount.
The compensation mechanism is therefore a sort of guarantee, for anyone receiving an unfavourable
price on the OPM will be compensated by his partner.  For example:  if the selling price is $95/amt,
sawmill i will receive $500 in compensation, at the rate of $5 for each 100 amt pre-negotiated. 
Conversely, if the price is $115/amt, paper mill j will receive $5 in compensation for each 100 amt
negotiated.  This compensation is regardless of whether or not sawmill i delivers to paper mill j. 
Note that paper mill j’s purchase price must not be more than $10 (UTC between i and j) higher than
the selling price obtained by sawmill i, otherwise paper mill j would find it advantageous to purchase
its woodchips from sawmill i and would re-establish the differential at $10.  Thus, the paper mill will
have to compensate sawmill i only if it receives a purchase price below the $110/amt negotiated.
 Similarly, sawmill i will not compensate paper mill j unless it receives a selling price higher than
the $100/amt negotiated.
Note that regardless of the quantity actually exchanged by either party, the amount paid in
compensation is calculated on the basis of the quantity negotiated (the quantity appearing in the
contract).  Note also that only long-term contracts negotiated in the form of compensatory contracts,
as established above, will be included in the OPM compensation mechanism.  Very long-term
agreements which specify no price are quite simply not taken into consideration by the OPM.
In more general terms, we propose the following rules, where Pij* is the price negotiated at the paper
mill and Qij* the quantity negotiated.
(1)  If Paj  £ Pij* £ (Pvi)rij + tij + sij, that is, if the price negotiated by compensatory contract lies
between the paper mill acquisition price and the sawmill selling price as established by the OPM,
then no compensation is paid.
4  Here, no compensation is necessary, since each party receives at least
as good a price as that negotiated in the long-term contract.  Note that it is possible to have Paj  <
(Pvi)rij + tij + sij, if the OPM determines that it is not mutually beneficial for i to deliver to j.
(2) If Pij* £ Paj £ (Pvi)rij + tij + sij, that is, if the price negotiated by compensatory contract proves to
be lower than the paper mill acquisition price and the sawmill selling price as determined by the
OPM, then compensation equal to (Paj - Pij*) Qij* is paid by the seller to the buyer.  Here, the buyer
must be compensated because the OPM price is higher than the negotiated price.  The seller may pay
this compensation because, for his part, he receives a beneficial price.
                                                
     
4 The mathematical formula (Pvi)rij + tij + sij corresponds to the sum of the sawmill selling price (weighted by the
multiplicative QAF where defined), the UTC and the additive QAF (where defined), established between sawmill i
and paper mill j.  On this topic, see Appendix 2:  Optimization module.Working Paper 1.0
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(3)  If Pij* ³ (Pvi)rij + tij + sij ³ Paj, that is, if the price negotiated by compensatory contract proves
to be higher than the paper mill acquisition price and the sawmill selling price as determined by the
OPM, then compensation equal to (Pij* - ((Pvi)rij + tij + sij)) Qij* is paid by the buyer to the seller.
 Here, it is the seller who must be compensated because the OPM grants him a lower price than the
price guaranteed to him by the contract.  Since the paper mill obtains on the OPM a price below the
negotiated price, it can afford to pay the compensation.
Note that the above-mentioned compensation rules guarantee each party at least the equivalent of
what was negotiated in the long-term contracts.
Let us consider, for instance, the case where a seller has negotiated a long-term contract with a buyer
guaranteeing him a price of $100/amt for 2000 amt.  Let us suppose that the seller’s true supply curve
(corresponding to actual costs per additional unit) is given by Offer O1.
Figure 1
In this example, the sawmill would agree to sell 2100 amt at the price of $100/amt (point E).
If the sawmill submits offer O2 to the OPM, it ensures that the status quo is maintained.  In fact,
whether its partner’s demand passes through Point A (Demand D1) or Point B (Demand D2), the
equilibrium quantity remains 2000 amt.  In one case the price is $65, and in the other $135, but this
does not much matter, since the compensation rules guarantee that the net price for the sawmill will
remain $100, as negotiated.
The sawmill could do better than Offer O2 by submitting, for instance, its true supply curve.  If its
partner’s demand passes through Point C (1500, 75), the sawmill will sell fewer woodchips.  The net
price of its 1500 amt of woodchips will be $100/amt and, moreover, the sawmill will receive $25
($100 - $75) in compensation for the 500 amt negotiated in addition, but not sold.  For the sawmill,
this situation is beneficial, since normally the sawmill was to deliver an additional 500 amt, for each
of which it would receive only $75 extra, or less than its production costs.  If the buyer’s demandWorking Paper 1.0
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passes through Point F, the sawmill is also a winner.  It sells 2000 amt at $100 each, but also an
additional 200 amt at $125, or a price higher than its production cost.
Thus, the OPM compensation rule and renegotiation mechanism offer a procedure guaranteeing:
• each player at least the equivalent of what is negotiated in the long-term contract;
• all agents the opportunity, where appropriate, of discovering and realizing profits from the
exchange which had not been realized.Working Paper 1.0
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3- Operation of the spot market
The spot, or short-term, market is an instrument which enables sawmills to liquidate their surpluses
and paper mills to acquire an additional quantity of woodchips as they need it.  A cap will, however,
be set based on the maximum percentage of quantities purchased or offered on the Optimized
Periodic Market, in order to keep the largest possible quantity of woodchips available and thus
ensure the efficiency of the OPM.  The woodchips exchanged on the spot market must be delivered
during the period between the last OPM session and the next one.
This market may, just like the OPM, operate by means of an electronic auction system.  In that case,
a BBS is installed, through which each participant initiates an auction to sell or buy woodchips.  An
offer to purchase or to sell specifies the woodchip type, the floor or cap price, the quantity, the type
of auction used, and the date and time of the start and end of the sale, while a bid must specify a
price and a quantity.  The technical requirements, UTC and QAF disclosed during the latest session
of the OPM are considered as being the same and will be used to make the conversion between
sawmill selling prices and paper mill acquisition prices.
The market may also be anonymous or nominal, that is, the offers to sell or purchase might or might
not be identified, as well as the winning bids.  In an anonymous market, participants do not know
the bidders’ identity.  All information, namely, UTC and QAF, is conveyed through a filter.  For
instance, for an offer to sell, the price displayed is the paper mill acquisition price, transportation and
QAF included.  For an offer to purchase, the price displayed will be the sawmill selling price,
transportation and QAF excluded. 
The spot market is a decentralized market.  Several auctions may therefore take place at once. 
Nonetheless, all the sales could occur, as with the OPM, in a common virtual site where all spot
market auctions would be announced. 
Several types of auctions may be used.  The market could offer participants submitting an offer to
sell or purchase the possibility of choosing the type of auction they wish to use.  The market must,
however, be clear and clearly specify the rules for each type of auction along with bid priority rules.
Here is an example of the mechanism that could be used.  It involves simultaneous multi-unit open
discriminant auctions.  These auctions are called simultaneous multi-unit because several units of
the same commodity, specifically woodchips, are sold or purchased at once.  The sales are also
described as open since the bids are made public as and when they are made, unlike the closed
auction where no information is given to participants until the bidding period is over.  Also, in an
open auction, participants may modify their bids as they wish, depending on other participants’ bids.
Finally, the last characteristic concerns the price paid by the winner or winners.  An auction is said
to be discriminant or first-price when the winners pay the amounts of their bids.  Conversely, an
auction is said to be non-discriminant or second-price when the winners pay only the amount of the
highest bid rejected or the lowest bid accepted.
Onsale, the largest, most complex site offering merchandise for auction on the Web, uses algorithms
for discriminant and non-discriminant simultaneous open auctions.  The auctions may last from
several minutes to several days.  Priority rules for ranking bids (price, quantity and time rules, etc.)Working Paper 1.0
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are set, as is an end-of-auction rule.  For an offer to sell, bids are first ranked in descending order of
price, then of quantity, and finally in chronological order (from the oldest to the most recent).  For
an offer to purchase, bids are first ranked in ascending order of price, then in descending order of
quantity, and finally in chronological order (from the oldest to the most recent).  Also, the sale
terminates if no bid has been received five minutes before a pre-set time, otherwise it continues and
ends five minutes after the last bid is received.  The winners are those who make the best offers
(highest selling price in the case of a sawmill, lowest purchase price in the case of a paper mill).  The
quantities are apportioned among the winners in order of priority.  It may therefore happen that a
winner does not receive the quantity he requested, but a lower quantity corresponding to the residual
quantity of the offer to sell or purchase.
Let us now look in more concrete terms at how the spot market operates, depending on whether it
is nominal or anonymous. 
Nominal spot market
Offer to purchase
Let us suppose that paper mill j wishes to make an offer to purchase.  It then completes a form in
order to provide the necessary information, namely, the maximum price it is prepared to pay (paper
mill acquisition price), quantity requested, woodchip type desired, auction type, and date and time
of end of auction.  An auction is then organized among interested sawmills.
Let us suppose that sawmill i wishes to take part.  It will then have access to the information in the
offer to purchase and will know the identity of the paper mill that provided it.  It will also be able
to know the condition of the market, that is, winning bids to date (price, quantity, and date and time
of bid) as well as the identity of the winners.  Bids are ranked in order of priority as described above
(ascending Pa).
Since the identity of the paper mill is disclosed, the sawmill knows the UTC and QAF associated
with this paper mill.  It can then easily convert the purchase price announced by the paper mill into
a selling price by means of the following formula:
(1)    Paj = Pvi + tij + sij .
It can also easily calculate the selling price it must offer to beat rival bids.  Let us suppose that Pa1
is the purchase price of the winning bid.  The selling price which sawmill i has to offer to beat this
bid will therefore be as follows:
(2)    Pvi < Pa1 - tij - sij .
Offer to sell
Let us now suppose that sawmill i wishes to make an offer to sell.  Like a paper mill in the case of
an offer to purchase, it must complete a form to provide the information necessary for the sale,
namely, the minimum price it is prepared to accept (sawmill selling price), quantity offered,Working Paper 1.0
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woodchip type, auction type, and date and time of end of auction. An auction is then organized
among interested paper mills.
Let us suppose that paper mill j wishes to take part.  Like the sawmill in the case of an offer to
purchase, it will then have access to the information in the offer to sell and will know the identity
of the sawmill which provided it.  It will also be able to know the condition of the market, that is,
winning bids to date (price, quantity and date and time of bid) as well as the identity of the winners.
This time, bids are ranked in order of priority (descending Pv).
Still using the same form (Form 1), the announced selling price can easily be converted by the paper
mill into a purchase price.  Similarly, the purchase price which paper mill j must offer to be able to
beat the existing bid is calculated as follows:
Paj > Pv1 + tij + sij
where Pv1 is the selling price of the winning bid.
Anonymous spot market
In the anonymous market, the identity of the paper mill or sawmill which initiates an auction, as well
as the identity of participants in the sale, remains secret, since prices are disclosed through a filter
which preserves each party’s anonymity.
Offer to purchase
Paper mill j wishing to make an offer to purchase must provide the same information as in the
nominal market, except of course for its identity.  In this case, however, the maximum price set by
the paper mill is automatically converted into a selling price using the following formula:
Pvi = Paj - tij - sij
where Paj is the maximum purchase price announced in the offer to purchase.
The amount of the winning bids is also automatically converted into a selling price, which the
sawmill may interpret directly as the price to beat.  For instance, let us suppose that sawmill k made
the best bid (offered the lowest purchase price to paper mill j), then the selling price disclosed to
sawmill i (Pv1) will be calculated as follows:
Pv1 = Pa1 - tij - sij
where Pa1 = Pvk + tkj + skj .
Offer to sell
Let us suppose that sawmill i makes an offer to sell.  Once again, the information provided by the
sawmill is the same as in the nominal market.  As for offers to purchase, it is the informationWorking Paper 1.0
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disclosed to the paper mills that is different.  The identity of the sawmill making the offer to sell is
not disclosed to the paper mills, and the minimum amount of the offer to sell is automatically
converted into a purchase price for the paper mills in order to preserve the sawmill’s anonymity.  In
fact, for paper mill j, the minimum purchase price disclosed is:
Paj = Pvi + tij + sij
where Pvi is the minimum selling price announced in the offer to sell.
The amount of the winning bids is also automatically converted into purchase prices which the paper
mill can interpret directly as the prices to beat.  For instance, let us suppose that paper mill n made
the best bid (it offered the highest selling price to sawmill i), then the purchase price disclosed to
paper mill j, Pa1, will be calculated as follows:
Pa1 = Pv1 + tij + sij
where Pv1 = Pan - tin - sin .
Let us now illustrate this with an example.  Let us suppose that sawmill i has surplus woodchips to
sell.  It then makes an offer to sell on the anonymous spot market.  Let us suppose that the offer to
sell concerns 10 amt of  low density woodchips offered at a minimum price Pvi = $100/amt.  Two
paper mills are interested in these woodchips.  The first, paper mill j, is located very close to
sawmill i, whence tij = $10/amt and its technical requirements correspond to sij = +$5/amt.  The
second, paper mill k, is located farther away from sawmill i, but its technical requirements are not
as high, whence tik = $25/amt and sik = -$5/amt.  Let us suppose that paper mill j wishes to make a
bid.  It must offer at least:
Paj = Pvi + tij + sij = 100 + 10 + 5 = $115/amt.
Let us suppose it offers $120/amt for the 10 amt of woodchips offered by sawmill i.  Sawmill i will
then receive a selling price equal to:
Pv1 = Paj - tij - sij = 120 - 10 - 5 = $105/amt.
Paper mill k which also wishes to make a bid is then in the following situation.  It initially had to
offer at least:
Pak = Pvi + tik + sik = 100 + 25 - 5 = $120/amt.
Since paper mill j has already made an offer, paper mill k now has to make an offer higher than:
Pak = Pv1 + tik + sik = 105 + 25 - 5 = $125/amt.
Let us suppose that at the end of the auction, paper mill j offers $120/amt for 5 amt of woodchips
and paper mill k offers $122/amt for 10 amt of woodchips.  The selling prices obtained by sawmill i
are therefore $105/amt for paper mill j and $122 - 25 + 5 = $102/amt.  Paper mill j whose offer isWorking Paper 1.0
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the higher will therefore receive the 5 amt of woodchips it asked for, whereas paper mill k, whose
offer is lower, will obtain the residual quantities, namely 5 amt.Working Paper 1.0
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Part III:  Frequently asked questions (FAQ)
- How will the transition between the current market and the smart market for woodchips take
place?  What will happen to existing long-term contracts?
There will be a training period before the market is set up.  During that period, participants will
become familiar with the system at specially organized briefings where they will be able to learn how
to develop strategies and to evaluate the impact of the information provided by the different market
players on prices and quantities exchanged. 
Then, when the smart market for woodchips replaces the existing market, it will be possible to
replace existing long-term contracts by compensatory contracts exchanged on the long-term market.
 Existing long-term contracts can also translate into agreements on quality adjustment factors.  All
solutions are possible.  The industry will have to consult together and make its own decision as to
which solution to adopt.
- Are special relationships between a paper mill and a sawmill still possible?
Yes, it is still possible for paper mills and sawmills to maintain special relationships.  The long-term
contract market allows participants who so desire to maintain long-term relationships between
themselves and even to create new ones.  Similarly, in Phase 3 of the pre-sale, paper mills and
sawmills can negotiate quality adjustment factors (QAF).  Thus, a paper mill may maintain special
relations with one or more sawmills so that they offer it a better QAF.  A sawmill may also offer a
better QAF to one or more specific paper mills with which it maintains good relations.  The purpose
of all this is to promote exchanges between them.
- What is the relationship between the price of lumber and the price of woodchips on the smart
market for woodchips?
When the price of lumber is high, then the sawmills operate at maximum capacity and produce more
woodchips.  The supply of woodchips is therefore momentarily increased, and if demand remains
steady, the price of woodchips on the OPM may be expected to drop.  Conversely, if the price of
lumber is low, the sawmills will produce fewer woodchips, and if demand remains steady, this will
generate a rise in the price of woodchips on the OPM.  The price will therefore adjust itself in order
to equalize supply and demand.  These adjustments are normal and necessary for the industry to
operate efficiently.  That is why it is important for the price-setting mechanism to be flexible.
- How can the OPM guarantee an allocation at least as beneficial for all participants as the one
specified in long-term contracts?
The compensation mechanism for long-term contracts proposed under the OPM has been designed
so that the exchanges determined at the end of an OPM session are always at least as beneficial for
everyone as the terms of the contracts.   A relatively technical explanation of the mechanism is given
in Section 2 (long-term compensatory market) of Part II of this paper, along with examples.Working Paper 1.0
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The essential idea is that, if a participant wishes, he can be sure to obtain at least the equivalent of
the pre-negotiated contract, that is, there is a strategy which guarantees, regardless of the state of the
market, at least the status quo.  It can, nevertheless, be shown that this strategy is not the optimal
strategy for participants.  There are strategies which are always at least as good (and in most cases
superior).
The OPM therefore enables participants, both sellers and buyers, to enhance their profit with respect
to long-term agreements.  Where do these profits come from?  How is it possible for everyone to
benefit from the system?
Let us not forget that the OPM seeks to maximize the profits of the industry as a whole.  If the pre-
negotiated quantities do not correspond to the optimal quantities, it is possible to seek additional
profits.  If the pre-negotiated exchange flows do not correspond to the flows whereby transportation
costs are brought down, other profits are possible.  The OPM identifies these profits and redistributes
them to participants.
- Currently, a certain quantity of unsold woodchips remains on the ground.  Will a smart market
resolve the problem of woodchip piles, or surpluses?
Recorded woodchip surpluses are, at least in part, the outcome of the rigidity which currently
characterizes the woodchip market.  This rigidity stems from the fact that the exchanges are
governed by long-term agreements whose renegotiation is generally detrimental to one of the parties.
 In the present situation, a sawmill which invites its partners to buy more woodchips is likely to see
the price negotiated in the long-term contract renegotiated downward, and he will have no guarantee
that it will rise again once the surpluses have been eliminated.  So, it is not very profitable for
sawmills to market their woodchip surpluses.
The OPM proposes a kind of objective tool for renegotiating long-term contracts.  The long-term
compensatory contract market is designed so that the parties are not prevented from dealing with
other partners if additional profits can thus be realized.  If it is in the interest of one of the parties,
or both, not to carry out the terms of a compensatory contract and to deal with a third party, the OPM
points this out and pays the compensation provided for so that both parties achieve at least the profit
level corresponding to the terms of the contract.
The OPM guarantees the price negotiated in the long-term contract for the equivalent of the
quantities pre-negotiated.  The OPM enables a sawmill to sell any additional quantity at a new
equilibrium price.  This additional quantity will be sold on the market to the buyer offering the
highest price, reflecting transportation costs and technical requirements.  Later, if the surpluses are
absorbed, the OPM will set new prices on the basis of supply and demand at the time, while
guaranteeing prices negotiated for the long term.  The incentives provided for by the OPM are
therefore different from the present system’s and favour temporary market readjustments.
The proposed market mechanism was therefore designed to limit the accumulation of surpluses and
avoid having the woodchips end up on the ground.  The objective of the proposed mechanism is to
prevent potential woodchip surpluses.  A sawmill which must supply the paper mill with which it
is bound by a long-term contract with a quantity of woodchips lower than its forecast output canWorking Paper 1.0
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attempt to sell its surplus woodchips on the OPM.  The OPM enables the seller to know exactly the
quantity of woodchips he must deliver during the period covered:  the seller is then in a position to
better plan his production and thus avoid the accumulation of unwanted woodchips.  Finally, if long-
term contracts, the OPM and better planning have not eliminated all surpluses, the seller can always
attempt to sell his woodchips on the spot market.
Another solution that could be envisaged to resolve the problem of "woodchip piles" would be to
open up a specific market.  In fact, certain paper mills, for various reasons, sometimes wish to
purchase less "fresh" woodchips.  This proposal limits the types of woodchips exchanged on the
market to three, but the industry could very well consider "woodchips on the ground" as a valid type
of woodchips (on the same basis as high density, low density and jack pine).  This solution does not,
however, guarantee that the woodchips will sell better, since they are damaged and demand for this
type of woodchips is very low.
Finally, one could potentially envisage OPM sessions open to foreign facilities.  Exports could then
be seen as another type of solution to the problem of "woodchip piles".  In a period of abundant
production, prices tend downward.  These low prices would have the impact of attracting foreign
buyers to the Quebec market.  This additional demand would mean surpluses could be sold off while
the product price was to some extent sustained.
- What will happen between Optimized Periodic Market sessions if a sawmill wishes to sell certain
quantities of woodchips or a paper mill wishes to buy an additional quantity of woodchips?
There will be the spot market, so paper mills and sawmills will be able to buy or sell a certain
percentage of their woodchips.  This percentage will act as a cap to ensure the necessary density for
the Optimized Periodic Market to operate properly.  The spot market allows participants to adapt to
unforeseen conditions which can arise during that period.
- Is collusion between participants possible?  How can it be avoided?
There are laws against this type of activity.  Beyond this legal protection, we believe the
opportunities for collusion in such a system are very slight.  In fact, during the sale stage, as the
market is anonymous, it is very difficult to comply and ensure compliance with agreements
previously reached with other participants.  Participants have only a few minutes to say whether they
have received the quantity desired, and if not, which quantity they want.  Nor have they any
guarantee that the others will respect their commitments and they will not be able to find out after
the sale whether or not the others have cheated.  In these conditions, collusion between participants
is highly unlikely, and indeed virtually impossible. 
- Does the system permit a form of discrimination, and if so, which?
Paper mills and sawmills can indeed practise a form of discrimination toward one another, but this
discrimination can only be "positive".
A paper mill can favour a sawmill by announcing a very low or even zero unit transportation cost
(UTC) between it and the sawmill.  An integrated paper mill, for instance, could act in that way inWorking Paper 1.0
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order to favour its own sawmill, but since this strategy has no impact on the market price, it would
most often be depriving itself of purchasing opportunities that it might be presented with.  If the
exchange between a paper mill and a sawmill is optimal, then the OPM will determine it.  Otherwise,
the OPM will find a more advantageous exchange for the integrated facility.  If on the other hand a
paper mill wishes not to do business with a specific sawmill, the only way for it to exclude it is to
lower the UTC between it and all the other sawmills.  This measure is possible, but proves very
costly for the paper mills.
As to the sawmills, they can treat a paper mill favourably not only by lowering the UTC between
themselves and the paper mill, but also by setting a quality adjustment factor (QAF) that will favour
the paper mill.  In the same way as for paper mills, a sawmill wishing to treat one paper mill in
particular unfavourably must lower the UTC and QAF of all the other paper mills.  In other words,
it must treat the other paper mills more favourably.  Once again, this strategy, while possible, is
unlikely, given the high costs associated with it.
- When is the market anonymous?
Step 1, the pre-sale, is not anonymous.  In fact, when the technical requirements are announced in
Phase 1 of the pre-sale, each sawmill becomes aware of the technical requirements of each paper
mill.  Similarly, in Phase 2 of the pre-sale, the sawmills in turn announce the quality adjustment
factors (QAF).  The paper mills learn in Phase 3 the QAF of each sawmill in response to their
technical requirements.  In Phase 3, the information contained in the transportation matrix is also
disclosed to the sellers, buyers and potential carriers, so that the auction can be carried out.
It is in Step 2 that the market becomes anonymous.  Participants disclose their supply and demand
schedules and receive the equilibrium prices and quantities.  Throughout this process, the
participants do not know with whom they will exchange their woodchips.  It is only in Step 3, the
after-sale, that the bilateral relations between the participants are disclosed.
- What happens in the event of default by a paper mill or a sawmill?
The penalties in the event of non-compliance with a paper mill’s woodchip quality requirements were
announced during Phase 1 of the pre-sale. When a sawmill does not meet its commitment toward
a paper mill, it must compensate it in the manner previously established by the industry. Similarly,
a paper mill not meeting its commitments toward one or more sawmills must compensate them.
Cases of force majeure (such as mill closures for fire, strikes, etc.) should also be the subject of
discussions and eventually agreement among paper mills and sawmills as to the means to penalize
those very facilities which are in default.
- Will all woodchips be sold on the smart market for woodchips?
For it to be really efficient, the smart market for woodchips should ideally include all fir, spruce, pine
and larch woodchips manufactured in Quebec.  This is a desirable, but not an essential condition.Working Paper 1.0
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- How should the frequency of the optimized market be set?
The frequency of the optimized market has been set at one month.  It could, however, be set at a
shorter or longer interval.  It is important that the frequency chosen not be too long so that, during
that time, participants can plan their supply and demand.  Adjustments are, however, always possible
on the spot market.  A longer interval makes it possible to lower the costs associated with using the
smart market system.  It also helps ensure provisioning over a longer period, but this advantage
already exists in the longer-term compensatory contract market.
- Is any carrier whatsoever entitled to participate in the auction on unit transportation costs
(UTC) which takes place during Phase 3 of the pre-sale?
It is possible, if the industry wishes, to limit participation in the UTC auction to accredited carriers.
  The latter could obtain accreditation if they meet certain criteria previously chosen through
discussion and an agreement within the industry.   This measure could prevent certain undesirable
carriers from interfering in the market.
- Who pays for the system?
A system like the smart market for woodchips requires a certain initial investment.  Such an
investment is needed in order to put in place the necessary technology (communication networks,
computers, smart market software, etc.) and should come from the main stakeholders in the industry.
Subsequently, the costs of using such a system are minimal when set against the total value of the
goods exchanged through the system.  They are of the order of tenths of percentage points.  For
instance, the annual costs of using the electronic pork auction (EÉP) accounted in 1994 for a mere
0.3191% of the total value of all the hogs sold to slaughterhouses using this system.
- Is the number of woodchip types limited to three?  Could other types of woodchips potentially
be traded on the OPM?
For the purposes of this proposal, we have chosen to divide woodchips into three types:  high
density, low density and jack pine.  But it is possible to envisage other types of woodchips:  planings,
sawdust, softwood chips, woodchips on the ground, etc.  The software designed to support the OPM
is generic:  changes can easily be made to it when necessary.
- Will large integrated facilities be able to manipulate the market more easily than they can at
present?
As soon as it is a question of pulling the strings in a given market, large players are better placed than
small ones.  This is all the more true when integrated facilities are in a position to intervene on both
the supply of and demand for a product.  The presence of major players is part of the present
situation in the woodchip market, and it will remain so in a smart market.  But it is clear that the
introduction of such a market mechanism will have the effect of stimulating competition and thus
to some extent reducing the influence of the larger players.  Indeed, the system was built so as to
ensure that participation is beneficial to all parties, large and small.Working Paper 1.0
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It is important to realize that market manipulation ultimately favours either those generating the
demand or those generating the supply.  Integrated facilities (paper mills with their own sawmills)
are by definition generators of both demand and supply on the woodchip market.  Rarely are they
major net buyers or sellers.  Whether it is a question of raising or lowering the price, the interest of
a player who buys almost as much as he sells on the market, or vice versa, is quite clearly very
limited.
- How will a sawmill which considers that it does not have the means to forward the merchandise
to one paper mill in particular be able to set about avoiding having the OPM force it to do so?
Let us consider the example of a paper mill which wishes to receive its woodchips only by rail.  How
can a sawmill which is not adequately equipped to deliver by this transportation mode convey this
information to the OPM?  The OPM does not ask participants to specify their preferred
transportation mode.  Only cost is important from the viewpoint of optimization of exchanges.  On
the other hand, if a sawmill, for instance, does not wish to deliver by rail, it will be able to announce
an initial UTC which is arbitrarily high for paper mills requiring delivery by train.  If the UTC
between a sawmill and a paper mill is very high, optimization of exchanges by the OPM will mean
that these facilities do not deal with each other.
In Phase 3 of the pre-sale, paper mills or carriers may announce on one segment a lower UTC than
was initially announced by a sawmill.  By bidding a lower UTC, a paper mill then undertakes to
handle the transportation and pay for it on the segment in question.  Exchanges between this paper
mill and this sawmill then become possible, but the sawmill does not have to concern itself with
transportation of the output.Working Paper 1.0
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Appendix 1:  Glossary
Buyer:  purchasing unit (pulp and paper mill) with given requirements and a given location.  Each
pulp and paper mill owned by a paper company constitutes a discrete buyer.
Carrier:  Any agent who is neither a buyer nor a seller and who agrees to handle the transportation
of woodchips over certain segments.
Compensatory contract:  Contract concerning a single type of woodchips guaranteeing both parties
compensation to the «loser» on the quantities negotiated if the price differs from the negotiated price.
 The compensatory contract therefore takes the form of a guaranteed price for a given quantity of
woodchips and concerns financial flow rather than the actual flow of woodchips.
Paper mill acquisition price (Pa):  Unit price paid by the paper mill, including transportation costs.
Quality adjustment factor (QAF):  Indicator calculated and supplied by sellers to allow for cost
variations stemming from the production of woodchips not meeting the previously defined reference
quality.  The proposed mechanism provides for two types of quality adjustment factors:  a sawmill
may use an additive and/or multiplicative QAF.
For instance, a sawmill assigns an additive QAF of 0 to a unit of reference woodchips.  If it costs a
sawmill more to produce a woodchip unit of superior quality to the industry standard, it will assign
this quality of woodchips an additive QAF higher than 0 (+ 5, for instance).  Conversely, an additive
QAF of - 4 will refer to woodchips intended for a buyer whose technical requirements are lower than
the industry standard.  While more than one interpretation of such an indicator may be imagined (cf.
Appendix 2), we shall restrict ourselves here to the most intuitive.  A sawmill which assigns an
additive QAF of + 5 to a quality of woodchips reveals that it is asking a premium of $5 per unit of
woodchips, compared with reference woodchips, for producing this type of woodchips.  At the same
time, if the unit production cost of reference woodchips for a given sawmill is $70, but it considers
that it can meet a given buyer's requirements with respect to woodchip quality at a lower cost, for
instance $60 per unit, it will assign to this quality of woodchips an additive QAF of - 10.
A sawmill also assigns a multiplicative QAF of 1 to a unit of reference woodchips.  For a unit of
woodchips whose production cost is higher, it will assign a multiplicative QAF higher than 1 (1.2,
for instance).  The interpretation of this coefficient is that to produce 1 amt of superior quality costs
the equivalent of 1.2 amt of reference woodchips.
Clearly, how sawmills determine their QAF will often depend more on a subjective interpretation
of their production costs than on their actual costs.  In this sense, a QAF may be interpreted as a
premium (positive or negative) charged by a sawmill to a paper mill whose requirements differ from
reference woodchips.
Reference woodchips:  Woodchips meeting technical requirements deemed to correspond to a
reference standard recognized by the industry.  No firm is obliged to produce reference woodchips,
and each firm may define its own woodchip quality requirements.Working Paper 1.0
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Sawmill selling price (Pv):  Unit price received by the sawmill, excluding transportation costs.
Seller:  Unit (sawmill) with a specific location.  Each sawmill owned by a paper company constitutes
a discrete seller.
Technical matrix:  Table presenting QAF established by each seller to meet each buyer’s technical
requirements.
Technical requirements:  Listing of each buyer’s requirements with respect to woodchip quality
(moisture content, size, and other characteristics, excluding species type).  In particular, the listings
will have to specify daily needs and the penalties imposed on sellers in the event of non-compliance
with quality requirements and daily needs.  These requirements apply to all sawmills, regardless of
source or species type of the woodchips offered.
Transportation matrix:  Table presenting the UTC between each buyer and each seller.
Type of woodchips:  We have defined three types of woodchips, by species, namely, low density
chips, high density chips, and jack pine chips.
Unit:  One anyhdrous (metric) tonne (amt) of woodchips.
Unit transportation cost (UTC):  Cost of transporting one unit on a given segment, ie., between
a sawmill and a paper mill (between a seller and a buyer).  By construction, UTC is the difference
between the paper mill acquisition price and the sawmill selling price.Working Paper 1.0
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Appendix 2:  Optimization module
The prices and quantities exchanged as a result of optimization of the system are those which
maximize the industry’s overall profits in the three markets at once, given the supply and demand
curves disclosed, and in light of the technical requirements and transportation costs.  The process
of auctions in successive rounds enables the players to refine their preferences, their supply and their
demand.  At the end of the process, since the players no longer wish to alter their bids, it is
reasonable to believe that the supply and demand disclosed are the "true" supply and demand curves.
 They therefore make it possible to set prices corresponding to quantities which maximize the
efficiency of the market and the profits of each facility.
The equilibrium prices generated by the system present the characteristic of being those which
maximize the industry’s efficiency.  To convince ourselves of this, let us look at the diagram below,
which represents a competitive market to which we could compare the woodchip market.  The
maximum overall profit, in this figure, corresponds to the shaded area to the left of the equilibrium
price, between the supply and demand curves.
Figure 2:  Competitive balance
It is possible to reinterpret the problem of setting equilibrium prices and quantities as a mathematical
problem of optimization.  Let us define utility function U(q), expressing buyers’ profit for a given
quantity q exchanged, by the area beneath the buyers’ demand curve.  This utility function is strictly
concave and differentiable.  Let us define a given cost function C(q) by the area beneath the sellers'
supply curve.  This cost function is convex and differentiable.
On a market, the overall profit is equal to the difference between buyers’ profits and costs.  The
optimization problem we must solve to maximize overall profits on the market may be expressed
as follows:Working Paper 1.0
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(1)      ) ( ) ( q C q U Max
q -
In this optimal solution, the marginal desire to pay is equal to the marginal cost of producing.  The
equilibrium price is set at the following value:
(2)      p q C q U = = ) ( ’ ) ( ’
Let us now look again at the analysis, introducing into it constant unit transportation costs t.  The
overall profit is now maximized at the quantity where the desire to pay is equal to the sum of the
marginal production cost and the unit transportation cost.  The problem to be maximized becomes:
(3)        tq q C q U Max
q - - ) ( ) (
Optimally, we have:
(4)      p t q C q U = + = ) ( ’ ) ( ’
The problem we have to solve is evidently more complex, but the logic remains similar.  We have
to introduce transportation costs, technical requirements and recipe constraints.  Mathematically, the
problem of allocation is presented as a problem of maximization under constraints, and with each
solution we may associate equilibrium prices.
A solution from the optimization program specifies a value for each qij
k, namely, the quantity of type
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where sij and rij correspond respectively to the additive and multiplicative QAF, tij corresponds to
the UTC between the seller and purchaser j, and mj
k and Mj
k correspond respectively to the minimum
and maximum proportions of type k woodchips in purchaser j’s recipe.
From the optimality conditions, we can construct equilibrium prices.  For buyer j, the optimization
module specifies purchase price Paj
k for each woodchip type k and an average price Paj.  For seller
i, we obtain selling prices Pvi
k for each woodchip type.  Using these prices, it is easier to understand
and interpret the optimization program’s optimality conditions.Working Paper 1.0
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First  we have:
(6) ) (åå ¢ =
ik
k




ij q  is the total quantity purchased by firm j at the optimum, the average price paid by j




is the quantity sold by sawmill i of type k (quantity weighted by multiplicative QAF), the selling
price for the reference quality is given by:
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that is, the price associated with this quantity on supply function i.  If sawmill i delivers type k
woodchips to paper mill j, the latter will have to pay for its woodchips as follows:




j t s r Pv Pa + + = ) (  if qij
k > 0.
that is, the price adjusted for QAF and transportation costs.  The paper mill will pay this price to all
sawmills that will deliver type k woodchips to it.  We should add that if sawmill i does not deliver
type k woodchips at the optimum to paper mill j, we will have:
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Obviously, the average price paid by paper mill j must meet the following condition:
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Note that if Paj
k < Paj, type k woodchips are less expensive than the others; if it is deemed optimal
to purchase other types of woodchips anyway, this is because paper mill j has already reached the
maximum proportion of type k woodchips allowed.  If type k woodchips are the cheapest, the paper
mill will use the maximum proportion of them.
(11)  If Paj
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Conversely, if type k woodchips are the most expensive, the paper mill will use the minimum
proportion of them.
(12)     If Paj
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In both these cases, the paper mill could profitably cut its costs by being more flexible in its recipe
requirements.
Conditions (6) through (12) summarize the overall conditions for market optimality.  The solution
thus obtained maximizes problem (5) and yields equilibrium prices.  The quantities obtained are
those which maximize the profits of the industry as a whole, in light of transportation costs and
technical requirements.  The prices obtained correspond to the equilibrium prices in a competitive
market.  Given these prices, the quantities obtained or sold correspond exactly to the quantities
requested or offered.  Note also that the market is balanced because the difference between the
amounts collected from buyers and the amounts paid to sellers exactly matches the negotiated
transportation costs.